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Why do people have kids in developed societies? We propose an empirical test of two 
alternative theories — children as “consumption” vs. “investment” good. We use as a natural 
experiment the Italian pension reforms of the 90s that introduced a clear discontinuity in the 
treatment across workers. This policy experiment is particularly well suited, since the 
“consumption” motive predicts lower future pensions to reduce fertility, while the “old-age 
security” to increase it. Our empirical analysis identifies a clear and robust positive effect of 
less generous future pensions on post-reform fertility. These findings are consistent with “old-
age security” even for contemporary fertility. 
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Couples in industrialized societies have much fewer kids than they used to. In 1950-
55, only 0.4% of the world’s population lived in areas in which the total fertility rate
(i.e., the average number of children per couple) was below the replacement level of
2.1 kids. This ﬁgure has risen to 43.3% in 2005-10, and is expected to reach 79.9% in
2045-50 (United Nations, 2007). Fertility decline had long been predicted as a long-
lasting phenomenon. Yet, observing some countries with below-replacement fertility
came as a surprise. Not any longer. In Southern and Central-Eastern Europe, and
later in Eastern Asia, fertility has indeed fallen to levels that are close to one child
per couple: the so called “lowest-low fertility” (Kohler et al., 2002).
The paper addresses this crucial issue: why are we not having as many kids as
we used to? Or, even more fundamentally, why do we have kids at all? In particu-
lar, why do parents decide to have kids in contemporary developed countries? We
review the two main motives for childbearing that exist in the literature, and assess
their empirical validity using a unique natural experiment. The family economics
approach, systematized by Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989),
suggests that parents are altruistic towards their kids. Individuals obtain directly
pleasure from having and raising children, and from their well-being. Kids thus
resemble a “consumption” good in the utility function of their parents, who will
optimally decide to share their resources between their own consumption and the
consumption of their oﬀsprings. Genetic endowments inﬂuence the propensity to
have children (see, e.g., Kohler et al., 1999; Rodgers et al., 2001). The “old-age
security” motive focuses instead on intergenerational ﬂows within the family and
considers children as an “investment” good. In line with early work by Leibenstein
(1957), Neher (1971), Caldwell (1978 and 1982), Cain (1981), and more recently
Boldrin and Jones (2002) argue that parents may decide to have children because
they expect to receive back a (monetary or in-kind) transfer from them in their old
age. In this case, altruism runs from the kids towards their parents. This “old-age
security” motive would be particularly relevant in societies in which family ties are
more binding and where there are no alternative reliable savings instruments.
In this paper, we provide a test of these two alternative theories of fertility in
2an advanced, post-demographic transition society, characterized by low fertility and
strong family ties: Italy. We analyze the eﬀect on fertility choices of two recent Italian
pension reforms (the so-called “Amato” reform in 1992 and the “Dini” reform in
1995), which suddenly — and substantially — decreased pension prospects for a large
group of individuals. These pension reforms represent a unique natural experiment,
which allows to address the relevance of the standard family economics approach
(or kids as a consumption good) versus the old-age security motive (or kids as an
investment good). The design of the reform introduced a clear discontinuity in the
size of future pension beneﬁts across workers. Pension beneﬁts of the individuals
with 15 years of contributions or more at the end of 1992 were not modiﬁed, while
pension entitlements were largely reduced for all other workers on a pro-quota basis,
which took into account their contributory history. A similar discontinuity, aﬀecting
exactly the same cohorts of workers, was then introduced by the Dini reform in
1995. The magnitude of the discontinuity is sizeable. Due to the reforms, a one-
year diﬀerence in the length of contributions in 1992 (14 vs. 15 years) for two
individuals with otherwise the same characteristics commanded a diﬀerence in the
pension replacement rate (measured as the ratio between the pension beneﬁta n d
the last wage prior to retirement) of 15 points — that is, a replacement rate of 80%
for the individual with 15 years in contributions in 1992 versus 65% for the other
individual.
This policy-induced natural experiment is particularly well suited to diﬀerentiate
between the two theories of childbearing, which predict opposite eﬀects of a reduction
i nt h ef u t u r ep e n s i o nb e n e ﬁts on the fertility. The traditional “consumption” motive
suggests in fact that a reduction in the future entitlements reduces life-time income
and should hence lead to a reduction in the parents’ own consumption and fertility
— provided that kids are “normal” goods. In their original contribution,1 Becker
and Barro (1988) argued in fact that, in a dynamically eﬃcient economy (i.e., when
the net present value from social security for a young individual is negative), an
increase in social security spending is analogous to an increase in the cost of having
kids, and should hence lead to lower fertility. The reduction in future pension
1Their model, however, was not built to address social security issues, since individuals were
assumed to live only in youth and in working age.
3beneﬁts experienced by the individuals who were aﬀected by the Italian pension
reforms decreases the net present value of social security and is thus equivalent to
an increase in the cost of having kids. Fertility should hence drop. The “old-age
security” motive instead leads to the opposite prediction (see Boldrin, De Nardi,
and Jones, 2005). The reduction in old-age resources for the aﬀected group, due
to the lower expected pension beneﬁt, should induce these agents to increase their
ﬁnancial assets and their fertility in order to support their old-age consumption2.
Our test of these two fertility motives is staged in Italy — a country characterized
by strong family ties (Reher, 1998; Dalla Zuanna, 2001; Giuliano, 2007). In fact,
according to a measure of the strength of family ties constructed by Alesina and
Giuliano (2007), Italy ranks third among the OECD countries, after Mexico and
Poland and followed closely by the US and Spain, while Germany and the Scandina-
vian countries have the weakest family ties 3 . The results of our empirical analysis
on the eﬀect of the Italian pension reforms emphasize the relevance of the “old-age
security” motive for contemporary fertility. We ﬁnd a clear positive eﬀect of the pen-
sion reform on the average number of post-reform children and on the probability of
having a kid after the reform. Sensitivity analysis conﬁrms the robustness of these
ﬁndings. Our ﬁndings complement previous results by Attanasio and Brugiavini
(2002) and Bottazzi, Jappelli and Padula (2007), who ﬁnd an increase in savings
among the individuals aﬀected by the (Amato) pension reform — particularly among
those who are better informed about the costs of the reform process. Interestingly,
all these empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the existence of a strong old-age se-
curity motive in the contemporaneous Italian society. The underlying belief that
support and insurance can be found within the family is also in line with Bentolila
2Clearly, were both motive to be equally present, these changes in pension beneﬁts would have
little or no eﬀect on fertility.
3Alesina and Giuliano (2007) construct a measure of the strength of family ties by considering
individual answers to three questions on the importance of the family carried out in diﬀerent waves
of the World Value Survey. The ﬁrst question asks how important the family is in one person’s
life; the second question asks whether the respondent agrees with one of these two statements: (i)
regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect
them; (ii) one does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it; and the
third question asks whether the respondent agrees with one of these two statements: (i) it is the
parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well being; (ii)
parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacriﬁce their own well being for the
sake of their children.
4and Ichino (2008) ﬁndings that in Italy and Spain — and to a large extent also in the
US, yet not in Britain — families provide a strong support, e.g., through monetary
transfers, to the male household head who becomes unemployed.
Our results have relevant implications. First, they help to clarify the existence
of a causal link running from public pension systems to fertility decisions: lower
pension beneﬁts increase fertility. Along these lines, our analysis might contribute
to explaining, at least in part, recent fertility trends, including the (mild) reversal
towards high fertility which has been observed in Italy since the mid-1990s. More-
over, it also suggests that in many developed societies, at least where family ties
matter, the strong decreasing trend in fertility may be partially due to the large
rise in pension spending. Second, our empirical ﬁndings fail to support the tradi-
tional “consumption” motive, which has become the workhorse model of fertility
choice in a recent literature on demographic transition and economic growth, or
female labor force participation. One should be aware of this shortcoming, in par-
ticular when drawing policy implications on how to revert this demographic trend4
(e.g., through public intervention aimed at the provision of services, such as publicly
funded child-care, or at tax reliefs or other monetary incentives), base on this “tra-
ditional” fertility model, especially for countries that feature a “traditional” family
structure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3b r i e ﬂy describes the Italian pension reforms of the 1990s, underlining the discon-
tinuity embedded in their design. Section 4 presents two models, which capture the
eﬀects of a pension beneﬁt reduction on the fertility under the two diﬀerent moti-
vations — kids as “consumption” or “investment” good. Section 5 presents the data
that we use and discusses our identiﬁcation strategy. The empirical results and the
sensitivity analysis are in section 6. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.
4A large debate has developed on this issue, especially since individuals in most of these countries
have repeatedly expressed their willingness to have more children than they actually do (Goldstein
et al., 2003).
52. Related Literature
Since the seminal papers by Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989),
a large literature has emerged that analyzes demographic phenomena based on the
“consumption” motive for fertility. The initial formulation of this theory has been
enriched with the introduction of several additional channels that may aﬀect fertility,
such as for instance human capital (e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990), child
mortality (e.g., Mateos-Planas, 2002, and Doepke, 2005), and health capital (e.g.,
Manuelli and Seshadri, 2009). Recently, Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007) and Jones,
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008) pointed out that the traditional formulation of this
theory is unable to reproduce the negative relation between fertility and income,
and endorsed an alternative interpretation in which the number of children and their
utility are not complements (as implicitly assumed in Becker and Barro, 1998), but
rather substitutes. This new formulation seems more promising in accounting for
the negative — cross section and time series — relation between fertility and income.
Along these lines, Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) extend Barro-Becker framework to
incorporate the decisions of accumulating human and health capital. Their richer
model is able to produce a negative correlation between total factor productivity
growth (and thus income) and fertility, and to account for part of the observed
cross-country diﬀerences in fertility.
An alternative theory of fertility, based on the “old-age security” motive, which
was initially introduced by Leibenstein (1957), has recently been formalized in a
general equilibrium framework by Boldrin and Jones (2002), who analyze the eﬀects
of a reduction in infant mortality on fertility. Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005)
subsequently used a calibrated version of the Boldrin and Jones (2002) model to
quantify the eﬀect of the rise in pension spending on fertility trends. According
to their calibrated model, around 50% of the long-term drop in fertility in the US
is accounted for by the pension system. The same quantitative experiment is also
carried out using a general equilibrium version of the Barro and Becker (1988) model,
which however delivers the opposite eﬀect. The “consumption” good model predicts
indeed a mild raise in fertility following an increase in pension spending. Manuelli
and Seshadri (2009) model with human and health capital is however able to restore
6the original Becker and Barro (1988) prediction that — in a dynamically ineﬃcient
economy — higher social security spending leads to lower fertility.
The link between social security and fertility has been extensively explored in
the literature, with several contributions implicitly endorsing the importance of the
“old-age security” motive. For instance, Sinn (2004) argues in favor of public pension
system since they provide an insurance against the risk of not having children, or
of having ungrateful children, who are unwilling (or unable) to take care of their
old parents. Yet, as also suggested by Sinn (2004) model, a drawback of public
pension systems is that, even in households with grateful children, they tend to
reduce kids-to-parents transfers. Parents have an incentive to “free ride” on the
social security contributions paid by other people’s children. As a result, fertility
falls (see Cigno, 1993). Policy suggestions to overcome this free riding problem are
for instance in van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2000, 2003), and Fenge and Meier
(2004). Empirical studies on the negative correlation between fertility and various
measures of the size or the generosity of the public pension system include Swidler
(1983), Cigno and Rosati (1992, 1996) and Galasso, Gatti and Profeta (2009).
Some empirical contributions have provided evidence in favor of the old-age se-
curity motive in contemporary societies. Kagitcibasi (1982) argued that old-age
security was not a reason for fertility in societies such as Germany and the U.S. dur-
ing the 1970s, despite this motive had been cited as “somewhat important” or “very
important” by 32 percent of married German women and 27 percent of married U.S.
women during interviews. Rendall and Bahchieva (1998) on the other hand, point
out to the potentially high relevance of old-age security motives in contemporary
developed societies, by providing an extensive documentation of the relevance of
children for providing support to their elderly parents in contemporary U.S: 11 per-
cent of all unmarried elderly in the U.S. live above poverty because of co-residence
with adult children, and observed poverty rates would double in absence of such
co-residence. Co-residence is therefore a crucial way to transfer income from adult
children to their elderly parents also in the US, a country that has almost the same
strength of family ties as Italy, according to the measure of Alesina and Giuliano
(2007). Recent analyses of comparative data on support towards parents show that
7in countries with strong family ties help to parents is more widespread (Kalmijn
and Saraceno, 2008). In a 1998 “Eurobarometer” survey, 76 percent of adult Ital-
ians state that in the future working adults may have to look after their parents
more than they do now, 52 percent that a needy elderly parent should co-reside
with a child, 23 percent state that children should have the main economic respon-
sibility when elderly parents are in need (Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008). Despite
its relevance, systematic empirical evidence of the existence of the old-age security
motive for fertility in contemporary developed societies is lacking up to date.
A recent and growing literature on demographic transition and economic growth
(see Galor, 2005, for a review) appears to have taken a stand on the oﬀ-the-shelves
fertility choice model to use. In fact, the “consumption” motive introduced by Becker
and Barro (1988) has become the workhorse model for fertility decisions, either in
its full-ﬂedged version with parents-to-kids altruistic preferences (see Doepke, 2005)
or in more reduced form versions (see for instance Galor and Weil, 2000, Galor
and Moav, 2002, de la Croix and Doepke, 2003, and Greenwood, Seshadri and
Vanderbrouche, 2005).
Finally, a small and recent empirical literature has exploited the peculiar discon-
tinuity and the related natural experiment created by the Italian (Amato and Dini)
pension reforms. These contributions include Attanasio and Brugiavini (2002), who
estimate the eﬀect of the reduction in pension beneﬁts on savings, Bottazzi, Jappelli
and Padula (2007), who analyze the impact on retirement decisions and Manacorda
and Moretti (2006), who concentrate on the decision of young children to leave the
parental home.
3. The “Amato” and “Dini” Pension Reforms
By the end of the 1980s, Italian social security spending was among the largest in
the world. Pension spending had increased from less than 1% of GDP in 1951, to
almost 15% in 1992, in the eve of the Amato reform, while the share of elderly (60
years old or more) in the population had increased from 12% to 25%. The aging
process, which had already increased the number of individuals entitled to a pension,
was partially accountable for the upward trend in pension expenditure, which was
8also due to an increase in the generosity of the pension beneﬁts. Faced with the
expectations of further aging and crisis, the Italian system was largely re-designed
during the nineties5 — mainly by the Amato reform in 1992 and the Dini reform in
1995.
The Amato reform introduced a gradual tightening, over a ten-year period, of
the eligibility requirements. Retirement age was increased to 60 years for women
and to 65 years for men, and the minimum contribution period for pension eligibility
was extended to 20 years. Moreover, the minimum contribution period for being
eligible to an early retirement pension was extended to 35 years for all (private and
public) workers. The reference wage in the pension beneﬁtf o r m u l am o v e df r o mt h e
average wage over the last ﬁve years prior to retirement to the average wage during
the entire working carrier, with past earnings capitalized at the cost of living index
plus 1% per year. Pension beneﬁt indexation moved from nominal wages to prices.
Yet, most of these reform measures did not apply to some generations of work-
ers. In particular, the beneﬁt calculations for the workers with at least 15 years
of contributions at the end of 1992 were untouched, and access to early retirement
remained virtually the same. For workers with fewer years of seniority, instead, the
new rules were applied pro-quota. Only to individuals who entered the labor market
in 1993 were the new rules entirely applied. Hence, this reform design gave raise
to large diﬀerences in the reduction of social security wealth across workers with
diﬀerent seniorities, as well as across public and private employees, who initially
enjoyed diﬀerent treatments.
To better understand this discontinuity, let us consider two workers6 in the pri-
vate sector with a high-school degree, who entered the labor market at the same
a g e( 2 0 ) ,a n dh a v eh a dt h es a m el a b o re a r n i n gp r o ﬁle. However, they were born
one year apart and thus had diﬀerent years of contributions at the end of 1992.
While Mr. Old is one year older — he was born in 1957 — and already had 15 years
of contributions, Mr. Middle (born in 1958) only had 14. Suppose that they will
both retire at age 60 upon reaching forty years of contributions. Mr. Old will then
retire in 2017 and his pension beneﬁts will entirely be calculated according to the
5See Brugiavini and Galasso (2004) for a detailed description of the reform measures.
6For simplicity and for consistence with the empirical part, we refer to male workers.
9pre-reform rules. His replacement rate — that is, the share of his labor income at age
59 replaced by the pension beneﬁt—w o u l db ea r o u n d8 0 % .M r .M i d d l ew i l li n s t e a d
retire a year later, in 2018. His pension beneﬁts will be calculated for almost two
thirds (26/40) according to the new rules, and only for the remaining part (14/40)
according to the pre-Amato reform scheme. For Mr. Middle, the replacement rate
would only be around 70%. This amounts to a large discontinuity: the pension
treatment of individuals who at the end of 1992 diﬀered in one year of contribution
only was set to be noticeably large.
Attanasio and Brugiavini (2002) estimated that, in the private sector, the drop
in social security wealth due to the Amato reform was equal to 27.6% for workers
born after 1957 and to 17% for those born between 1945 and 1957. This reduction
was even larger among the public employees: respectively 32.1% for the younger
workers and 27.1% for the 1945-1957 generation.
In 1995, the Dini reform completely redesigned the architecture of the Italian
social security system, shifting from deﬁned beneﬁtt on o t i o n a ld e ﬁned contribution.
Eligibility criteria were also largely revised. Seniority pensions, whose eligibility
was exclusively based on reaching a minimum contribution period, were abolished.
Under the private employees’ scheme, the minimum number of years of contribution
to be eligible for a pension was reduced to 5 years only; however, only individuals
aged between 57 and 65 years are entitled to a pension. As for the Amato reform,
these measures were introduced along a transition path that left those workers with
at least 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995 unaﬀected, while being applied
pro-quota for the less senior, and entirely only for the workers entering the labor
market in 1996. Interestingly, those workers who escaped the retrenchment of the
Dini reform had already been unaﬀe c t e db yt h eA m a t or e f o r m . R e t u r n i n gt oo u r
example, while Mr. Old maintained his (expected) replacement rate of 80%, Mr.
Middle only had 17 years of contributions in 1995 and thus had to face a further
reduction in his (expected) pension beneﬁts. Leaving his retirement age unchanged
at 60 years, his replacement rate would in fact drop to around 65%.
Bottazzi et al. (2007) assessed the diﬀerential impact of the Amato and Dini
reforms on three classes of workers: those with a seniority of 18 years in 1995 (and
1015 in 1992), those with a lower seniority and those who entered the labor market
after 1995. The diﬀerences in the reduction of their replacement rate — as measured
by the ratio of pension beneﬁtt ot h ea v e r a g ew a g ei nt h el a s tﬁve years prior to
retirement — are quite large. Among the private employees retiring at age 60, the
replacement rate is reduced by 1 point (from 67.3% to 66.3%) for the senior workers,
by 9.1 points (from 67.3% to 58.2%) for the less senior and by 12.4 points for the
young. The impact is larger among public sector employees, with a drop of 5.1
points among the senior, of 20.6 among the less senior and of 26.7 among the young.
These major changes did not come unperceived, nor was the diﬀerential impact
of the reform across generation of workers underplayed. Quite the opposite. Besides
the strikes that broke out in 1992 and 1994, and the debate that took place in the
press, estimates by Bottazzi et al (2007) suggest that private employees were well
aware of the magnitude of the reform and of its diﬀerential impact according to the
years of contributions. In particular, less senior private employees expecting to retire
at age 60 quite accurately forecasted their replacement rate to be reduced by 8.4
points, whereas senior workers overestimated the drop in their replacement rate (4.3
points). The relevance of these reforms and their diﬀerential eﬀect is also evident
in the workers intention to postpone retirement after the reform. Consistently with
this diﬀerential eﬀect, Bottazzi et al. (2007) estimate the increase in the expected
retirement age to be larger for middle aged (born after 1957) than for more senior
workers.
4. Two Models of Fertility Decisions
In this section, we introduce two overlapping generations models, which characterize
the households’ fertility decisions under the “consumption” good motive and under
the “old-age security” motive. They will provide a useful background for subsequent
empirical analyses, by showing how the Italian pension reforms described in section
3m a ya ﬀect fertility decisions under these two diﬀerent motives for childbearing.
Fertility decisions are taken at the household level. For each household, we
consider a representative altruistic individual (for simplicity a man), who cares about
his youth and old-age consumption, but also (i) about the wellbeing of his parents,
11in the “old-age security” model; and (ii) about the utility of his oﬀsprings, in the
“kids as consumption good” model7.
During the ﬁrst period of their life, individuals work, and earn a wage wt,o n
which they pay contributions, τt ∈ [0,1], that are used to ﬁnance a PAYG pension
system, and a proportional tax, σt ∈ [0,1], which provides general revenues. Their
net labor income is summarized by yt = wt(1 − τt)(1 − σt). They may also receive
ab e q u e s t ,bt, from their (altruistic) parents. Their total amount of resources when
young are used to consume, Ct
t,t os a v e ,st,t or a i s eft kids, and — if kids-to-parents
altruism is present — to transfer resources to their parents, dt. Bringing up a child has
a ﬁxed marginal cost, γ. In the second period of their life, agents do not work, but
may obtain resources from three sources: private savings, transfers from their kids
and public pensions. Their total income is divided between old age consumption,
Ct
t+1, and (if altruistic) bequest to their kids, bt+1.




t + γft + st + dt = wt(1 − τt)(1 − σt)+bt = yt + bt (4.1)
C
t
t+1 + bt+1ft = stRt+1 + dt+1ft + Pt+1 (4.2)
Notice that superscripts denote the time of birth of the individual, and time sub-
scripts denote time of action. Hence, Ct
t and Ct
t+1 represent respectively the con-
sumption in youth and in old age for an individual born at time t,a n dft indicates
fertility for an individual at time t.M o r e o v e r , Rt+1 i st h ei n t e r e s tf a c t o ro nt h e
savings, and Pt+1 represents the pension transfer at time t +1 .
Throughout his life, each individual chooses the amount of savings, st, fertility,
ft, and the amount of the transfer — either dt or bt+1— while taking prices, (wt,Rt+1),
and ﬁscal variables, (τt,σt,P t+1) as given.
7In the appendix, we consider a popular reduced form speciﬁcation of the “kids as consumption
good” model, in which parents care about the number of kids, rather than about their utility (see
Galor and Weil, 2000, Galor and Moav, 2002, de la Croix and Doepke, 2003, and van Groezen et
al., 2003).
12To study the eﬀects of the pension reforms, we consider an exogenous change
in the pension beneﬁts, Pt+1. Recall that the two Italian social security reforms
of the 1990s provided a diﬀerential treatment to those with more than 15 years of
contributions in 1992 (and 18 in 1995), who were mostly unaﬀected by the reforms,
and to those with fewer years of contributions, who had their future pension beneﬁts
largely reduced. To capture this policy change, we consider two groups of indivi-
duals. Up to time t, all agents are identical. At time t, however, individuals in the
aﬀected group learn that they will experience a reduction in their future pension
beneﬁts, PA
t+1,w h i l et h eunaﬀected will not — hence, PA
t+1 <P U
t+1. We then examine
how this diﬀerence in future pension beneﬁts inﬂuences the fertility decision in the
two groups under the two motives for childbearing.
Finally, we model Italy as a small open economy, in which the social security
reforms will not aﬀect wages and rates of return8. In the theoretical model, we thus
choose to focus speciﬁcally on the impact of the reforms on the fertility that takes
place through the income eﬀect, given that one group of workers faces an expected
negative income eﬀect, while the other does not. This represents the main eﬀect in
creating a potential gap in the fertility response of the two groups of individuals.
4.1. Kids as Consumption Good
This model generalizes the original speciﬁcation presented by Becker and Barro
(1988) to a two-period overlapping generations framework, in which individuals take
saving and fertility decisions at the beginning of their working life (the ﬁrst period)
and retire — and leave bequest to their children — in the second period. Agents are
altruistic towards their kids. In particular, individuals care about their own youth
and old-age consumption, as well as about the youth and old-age consumption of
all individuals in their dynasty, according to the following utility function:
8Several recent contributions (see Boldrin and Jones, 2002, and Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones,
2005) suggested that the eﬀect of social security spending on fertility — both in the old-age security
and in the kids as consumption good model — works also through general equilibrium eﬀects.
Namely, social security spending aﬀects savings and thus the stock of capital. The resulting



















where Nt represents the number of individuals in the family dynasty at time t,a n d
hence Nt+1 = Ntft,a n dct
t = Ct
t/Nt represents per-capita consumption. The de-
gree of altruism towards the future generations is measured by the parameter μ.
We consider a CES utility function U(Ct
t)=( Ct
t)ρ/ρ. As discussed in Jones and
Schoonbroodt (2007), this optimization problem is compatible with two parame-
trizations: (i) 0 <ρ<μ<1, as originally proposed by Becker and Barro (1988),
and (ii) μ<ρ<0, as suggested by Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007).













subject to the budget constraints at equations 4.1 and 4.2, where we set dt = dt+1 =
0. Each individual chooses the amount of savings, st, and her fertility, ft —i nt h eﬁrst
period of her life, and the amount of bequest to her kids, bt+1 — in the second period.












































for the bequest decision.
While the ﬁrst equation — determining the savings decision — has the usual in-
terpretation, the second equation identiﬁes the reasons for having kids in a Becker
and Barro (1988) model. An additional kid increases the parents’ utility due to
the increase in the well-being of the oﬀsprings9 (LHS of eq. 4.6), but reduces the
9Indeed, the children’s utility is positive for ρ>0. In this case, an additional kid increases the
parents’ utility if μ>ρ>0.F o rρ<0, the children’s utility is instead negative. In this case, an
additional kid increases the parents’ utility if μ<ρ<0.
14consumption of the parents — and thus their utility — because kids are costly to raise
a n dp a r e n t sc h o o s et oe n d o wt h e mw i t hab e q u e s t( R H So fe q .4 . 6 ) .T h et h i r de q u a -
tion describes the trade-oﬀ associated with bequeathing wealth to the oﬀ-springs:
a parent’s lower consumption in old age (RHS of eq. 4.7) is compensated by the
increase in consumption by the children who receive the transfer (LHS of eq. 4.7).
Using these ﬁrst order conditions and the budget constraints, we can obtain an
























Individuals who are negatively aﬀected by the pension reform will have fewer
resources to dedicate to their children in terms of raising costs and bequest. In
particular, it is straightforward to see that — for both parametrizations regarding ρ
and μ —ar e d u c t i o ni nt h ef u t u r ep e n s i o nb e n e ﬁt reduces the fertility rate, provided
of course that kids are a normal good. The model presented in the appendix that
uses a popular reduced form speciﬁcation, in which parents care about the number of
kids, rather than about their utility, provides the same qualitative results. Hence, if
our empirical analysis were to ﬁnd a reduction in fertility for the individuals aﬀected
by the Italian pension reforms of the 90s, this result would be consistent with kids
being a consumption good.
4.2. Kids as an Investment Good
In this speciﬁcation, agents are altruistic towards their parents. Individuals care
about their youth and old-age consumption and about their parents’ old-age con-










t represents the old-age consumption for an individual born at time t−1,
and η is a measure of the kids-to-parents altruism. The budget constraints in youth
and old age for an agent born at time t correspond to the expressions at equations
4.1 and 4.2, with bt = bt+1 =0 .
15In the ﬁrst period of his life, each individual chooses the amount of savings, st,
the fertility, ft,a n dt h ea m o u n to ft r a n s f e rt oh i sp a r e n t s ,dt, while taking prices,
(wt,Rt+1) and ﬁscal variables, (τt,σ t,P t+1), as given, but forming expectations on
the future transfers, dt+1, that he may receive from his children. In choosing the
transfer to their parents, we assume that children play a cooperative game among
siblings, by jointly determining how much support to give to the parents10.
































for the transfer decision.
The last equation describes the trade-oﬀ associated with transferring resources
to the parents: the lower consumption in youth has to be compensated by the utility
provided by the parents’ higher consumption, weighted by the degree of altruism and
by the number of siblings that are also providing the transfer. The ﬁrst two equations
characterize the individual saving and fertility decision. It is important to notice
that these decisions may inﬂuence the future transfer, dt+1, that an individual may
receive from his kids. Individuals take this element into account in their optimization
problem and thus need to form expectations on this future transfer, dt+1.
Starting from the optimization problem of the individuals at time t +1 ,s i m p l e
algebra shows that, if these individuals optimally choose to save, i.e., for st+1 > 0,















and the parents’ old age consumption corresponds to
10Alternatively, children could play a non-cooperative Nash game among each other on how















(Rt+1st + Pt+1). (4.14)
Using the above equation and the ﬁrst order conditions at equations 4.10 and
4.11, we can obtain the arbitrage condition that equalizes the returns from investing










where the left hand side represents the return on the private assets and the right
hand side measures the return from “investing” in kids, when the endogenous de-
termination of the kid-to-parents transfers is taken into account.
Recall the policy experiment that we are considering: at time t, some individuals
learn that their future pension beneﬁts, PA
t+1, will decrease. Interestingly, this change
in the policy does not aﬀect the return from investing in kids. This is because — as
shown at eq. 4.13 — the kids adjust their transfers according to the old-age wealth
of their parents, as measured by Rt+1st +Pt+1. Hence, the arbitrage condition that
characterizes the saving and fertility decisions of the individuals at time t continues
to hold, unless there is a change in the future rates of returns, Rt+1 and Rt+2,o r
in the pension beneﬁts at time t +2 . If individuals at time t were planning to
“invest” both in assets and kids, i.e., ft > 0 and st > 0, they will continue to do
so even after learning about the reduction in their future pension beneﬁts. Thus,







obtained from eq. 4.14, to evaluate the eﬀect of a drop in the pension beneﬁts on
the individuals’ fertility and savings decisions. Simple algebra shows that individuals
who are negatively aﬀe c t e db yt h ep e n s i o nr e f o r m ,PA
t+1 <P U
t+1, will purchase more
assets and will have more kids than the unaﬀected group, because of the negative
income eﬀect in old age. This is because individuals with lower pension beneﬁts —
the aﬀected group — will want to move more resources into the future to support
their old age consumption. As the arbitrage condition is unaﬀected, and thus the
returns of ﬁnancial assets and fertility are unchanged, they will increase both asset
holding and fertility.
To summarize, this model of old-age security suggests that the individuals af-
17fected by the Amato and Dini pension reform will save more — in assets and kids —
than the unaﬀected group. If the old-age security motive were still predominant in
the Italian society in the 90s, our empirical results should unveil a higher fertility in
the group of individuals negatively aﬀected by the pension reforms.
5. Context, Data and Identiﬁcation Strategy
In order to test the two fertility motives, we study the impact of Italian pension
reforms on fertility choices for individuals and households who are aﬀected,o ru n -
aﬀected. Italy represents a particularly interesting case for the study of fertility
choices. Together with Spain, Italy has been the ﬁrst country to steadily experience
fertility levels below a threshold deﬁned of “lowest-low fertility” (a total fertility
rate of 1.3 children per woman or below) during the 1990s (Kohler et al., 2002). In
order to visualize recent fertility developments, the Italian total fertility rate in the
period 1970-2006 is compared those of Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom
in Figure 2. In the literature, there is no clear consensus on the reasons behind this
sharp decline in fertility (nor on the recent increase), although a mix of cultural,
economic and measurement factors are probably coexisting in shaping changes and
cross-national diﬀerentials in the total fertility rate. Here we only focus on the
motives that are consistent with the model previously discussed.
As anticipated, our identiﬁcation strategy is based on comparing households who
are aﬀected by the Amato and Dini reforms (i.e., the treatment group) with those
who are unaﬀected (i.e., the control group). We use self-reported data on years of
contribution to separate, through the discontinuity introduced by the reforms, the
treatment from the control group. The reforms aﬀected couples in central child-
bearing ages for Italian standards. Men in married couples who had 15 years of
contribution at the end of 1992 had on average about 35 years of age (to be precise,
their average age in 1992 was 34.45 years). Their wives were on average 3.8 years
younger (the average age of the wife in 1992 was 30.67 years). This age interval is
particularly relevant, in contemporary Italy, for fertility choices. Although we later
provide speciﬁc ﬁgures on the dataset we use, it is useful here to recall that fertility
at ages 30+ has been increasing ever since the mid 1980s (see Figure 3). Indeed,
18Italy has become the leading country in “late” childbearing (Billari et al., 2007).
This is a clear consequence of the postponement of childbearing, a phenomenon
that accompanies (and partly causes) the emergence of lowest-low fertility, and that
i sl i n k e dt oa—a tl e a s tp a r t i a l—r e c u p e r a t i o no ft h ep o s t p o n e db i r t h sa tl a t e ra g e s .
It is therefore increasingly important, in the explanation of fertility, to understand
the motives of childbearing of women ages 30, 35 or even more.
We analyze two speciﬁc datasets that we build using data from the Bank of
Italy’s Survey of Italian Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW from now onwards).
This is a bi-annual survey, with some individuals repeatedly interviewed, which
mostly collects, as the title says, data on income and wealth of Italian households.
Crucial for our identiﬁcation strategy is the fact that the SHIW contains data,
provided by respondents, on the total number of years each household member has
contributed to the pension system (at December 31st of the reference year of the
survey). Given the strong attachment of Italian men to the labor market, we assume
that the number of years of contributions at December 31st 1992 (or 1995), i.e., the
reform reference date, can be derived from the number of years of contributions
at December 31st 1992+λ,w h e r eλ=6,8,10,12,14, depending on the most recent
SHIW wave for which a given respondent was interviewed. For example, a person
who has at least 27 years of contributions in 2004 (December 31st) is assumed to
have had at least 15 years of years of contributions in 1992 (December 31st) —
and therefore be unaﬀected by the reforms. On the contrary, a person who has 26
years of contributions in 2004 is assumed to have less than 15 years of contributions
in 1992 — and thus be aﬀected by the reforms. Reform is a therefore a simple
dichotomous variable representing the treatment eﬀect in this natural-experiment
setting. Recall bias and lack of precision in reporting years of contributions certainly
induce measurement error in the identiﬁcation of the treatment and control group.
However, the bias of such measurement error implies an underestimation of the
eﬀect of the reform, therefore the subsequent results might be conservative11.W e
use this strategy to identify aﬀected and unaﬀected men, but we cannot use the
same strategy for women, given their lower labor force participation, which is indeed
11The lack of more precise data on contributions (e.g. months, or weeks) prevents us from
adopting a regression discontinuity design in subsequent analyses.
19related to fertility decisions and, even more problematically, the link between fertility
and labor force withdrawal typical of the Italian case (Del Boca and Vuri, 2007).
Consistently with the model, fertility is considered as a household decision. We focus
on households with individuals who were married at the time of the surveys, and
evaluate the eﬀect of the reform focusing only on men as the aﬀected or unaﬀected
individuals. The focus on married couples should not bias our results, given the
particularly low extra-marital birth rates and divorce rates during the period covered
(see, e.g., Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna, 2008).
We also exploit other data provided by the SHIW, such as the date of births of all
household members, including husband, wife, and co-resident children. Moreover,
we use data on the number (although not the date of birth) of non-resident children.
We also include other control variables, such as educational level of both partners
and the area of birth of the husband. We can reconstruct the couple’s fertility history
by using the date of birth of co-resident children. All non co-resident children are
b o r nb e f o r et h et i m eo ft h eﬁrst reform, i.e. up to 1992 (this assumption does not
aﬀect subsequent results as we focus on childbirths from 1993 onwards). These
assumptions are relatively mild in the case of Italy where children tend to co-reside
with parents for a long time (well into their mid 20s). We only use data on household
with wives born in 1955 or after (who are therefore not older than 41 in 1996).
A ﬁrst test we conduct is a simple t-tests for the comparison of mean fertility
of individuals who are just before (up to a year) and just after (up to a year) the
threshold (15 years of contributions at the end of 1992, 18 years of contributions
at the end of 1995) using information available or reconstructed at the time of the
surveys. Table 1 contains the results of this test on these individuals who are as
close to the discontinuity as we could get, performed on a sample of 201 unaﬀected
individuals and 198 aﬀected individuals. Indeed, while the number of children prior
to 1993 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two groups (nor it is for the number
of children prior to 1996), fertility after the reforms is signiﬁcantly higher for the
treated. More speciﬁcally, after the Amato reform, aﬀected individuals have on av-
erage 0.4899 children, while unaﬀected individuals have on average 0.3134 children
during the same period, which includes the eﬀect of both reforms. After the 1995
20Dini reform, aﬀected individuals have on average 0.3586 children, while unaﬀected
individuals have 0.2338 children during the same period. Our ﬁrst evidence is there-
fore in favor of a signiﬁcant, and sizable, negative eﬀect of pensions on fertility, in
accordance with the “old-age security” motive.
Whether a person is aﬀected or not by the reforms depend on the assumption of
continuous labor market attachment and on the good measurement of the variable of
our interest. Moreover, other covariates may inﬂuence the estimation of the reform
eﬀect. The results of the simple comparison using t-tests displayed in Table 1 is
subject to limitations. In particular, given the link between age at entry in the labor
market and exposure to the reform, we can expect that unaﬀected individuals are, on
average, older than aﬀected individuals. If we take, as in Table 1, a one-year window
around the reforms’ threshold, we ﬁnd that aﬀected individuals (husbands) have an
average age of 35.45 years, against an average age of 36.57 years for unaﬀected
individuals. An average diﬀerence of one year in age translates almost equally into
an average diﬀerence of one year in contributions. The same is true for the wives, as
the average age of the wives of aﬀected individuals is 31.67 years, against 32.88 years
for the unaﬀected. Figures 4 and 5 show, however, that despite the average one-
year age diﬀerence between aﬀected and unaﬀected individuals, there is a substantial
amount of variability, with common support and an important overlap in the age
distributions of aﬀected and unaﬀected individuals. Therefore we choose to develop
a series of regression models that control for the diﬀerent age distribution, as well
as for other potentially inﬂuential factors.
We extend the previous analysis with the inclusion of a series of control variables
which are likely to aﬀect both inclusion into the treatment or control group and
fertility outcomes. In particular, we control for age (and education) of the husband,
age (and education) of the wife, geographical area (using the area of birth of the
husband). In order to have a more robust sample size, we also extend our sample
to include individuals who are more distant from the discontinuity induced by the
reform. In the next section, we will also carry some additional sensitivity analyses
for the robustness of our results.
Most analyses are conducted using a dataset where we compare individuals who
21are up to 7 years below the threshold number of years of contributions (and thus
aﬀected by the reform) with individuals who are up to 7 above the threshold (un-
aﬀected). The sample size is 2,684, with 59.65 percent of individuals being aﬀected
by the reform. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on this extended dataset (all
variables, with the exception of fertility and reform refer to the time of the survey).





1 · reformi + β
0
2 · xi +  i (5.1)
where fi is post-reform fertility for the i-th individual, Reformi is a dichotomous
indicator (=1 if the i-th individual is aﬀected, =0 otherwise), xi is a vector of
control variables,  i is white noise. The estimated coeﬃcient ˆ β
0
1 is therefore the
average eﬀect of the reform on treated individuals on the number of post-reform
children.
A second type of model focuses on the probability that at least one post-reform
child is born, with a probit speciﬁcation:





1 · Reformi + β
1
2 · xi) (5.2)
where Φ−1 is the inverse standard-normal distribution, and the estimated coeﬃcient
ˆ β
1
1 is the average eﬀect (via inverse Mill’s ratio) of the reform on the probability of
having at least one post-reform child for treated individuals.
The data, however, contain more information than just the number of post-
reform children. More speciﬁcally, we can also exploit information on the timing of
births, as is usually done in empirical analysis of fertility choices. Moreover, we can
exploit the fact that some of the factors we focus on vary over the observation time
(this is the case of husband’s or wife’s ages, or calendar year). To this purpose, we
build a second dataset that contains observations in terms of persons-years, i.e., an
entry for each individual i in each given year of observation j,f r o m1 9 9 3o n w a r d s .
In this second dataset, the age of husbands and wives is updated every year. The
appropriate method to analyze persons-years datasets is discrete-time event history
analysis (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1995) with the adoption of a hazard rate approach to
the timing of births (see, e.g., Newman and McCulloch, 1984). Each household
contributes to the sample as long as they are observed, and they leave the sample
22either when they are interviewed (in this case information is right-censored) or when
they have another child. As the number of post-reform children is low on average,
we only consider the progression to the ﬁrst birth after the reform. Therefore, with
the second dataset, we use a discrete-time probit speciﬁcation, where the left-hand-
side variable is the hazard rate, i.e. the annual probability of having an additional
birth for the individual i during the year j, given that the same individual has not
yet had an additional birth in earlier years of observation:





1 · Reformi + β
2
2 · xi + β
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3 · vij) (5.3)
In eq. 5.3, Bi denotes the time of ﬁrst post-reform birth, j is the year of observation,
potentially between 1993 (j=1) and 2006 (j=14), (j =1 ,...,J i,w h e r eJi < 14 is the
last year of observation for the i-th individual), xi is a vector of time-constant control
variables, vij is a vector of variables that vary across years. ˆ β
2
1 is the estimated
average eﬀect (via inverse Mill’s ratio) of the reform on the hazard of a post-reform
birth for treated individuals.
6. Results
We now look at the results of our analysis (complete results of regressions and scripts
are available upon request from the authors), starting from the study of the ﬁrst
dataset. Table 3 displays the results on the eﬀect of the reform on the: a) number
of children born starting from the year after each of the reforms and until the date
of the survey (columns (1) and (2), OLS, as in eq. 5.1); b) probability of having an
additional child during the same period (columns (3) and (4), Probit, as in eq. 5.2).
The estimated eﬀects of the reform are displayed in the “Reform” line (in terms of
marginal eﬀects for the Probit). In these regressions, we control for several elements
that may aﬀect the number of years of contributions individuals had in 1992 (and
in 1995) and their fertility behavior. In particular, we carefully control for: age of
husbands and wives (using age ﬁxed-eﬀects), level of education of husbands and of
wives, geographical area, and the number of kids that they already had prior to the
reforms. As might be expected, some of these controls have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. For
instance, more educated women — who presumably decided to postpone fertility —
23are more likely to have kids after the reform. Individuals in the South are more
likely to have children, whereas individuals who had more kids prior to the reform
are less likely to have additional children afterwards. According to these estimates,
after controlling for all these covariates, the average number of children for treated
couples is 0.0529 higher since the 1992 reform (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). The
eﬀect is positive (0.0329) but not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level when we
look at the post-1995 Dini reform only. The magnitude of the ﬁrst eﬀect should be
compared to an average of 0.4010 post-reform children (i.e. it amounts to 13% higher
fertility), and the magnitude of the second eﬀect, which is however not statistically
signiﬁcant, to an average of 0.2957 post-Dini reform children (11% higher fertility).
Results on the Probit model on the probability of having an additional post-reform
child also point towards the same direction: individuals who are aﬀected by the
reform have a 18.6% higher probability of having post-1992 reform children (10.4%,
but not statistically signiﬁcant, for the post-1995 reform eﬀect).
Therefore, the ﬁndings from this regression conﬁrm the direction of the eﬀect
found in Table 1, pointing towards the prevalence of an old-age security motive
for childbearing. The joint eﬀects of the two reforms (post-1992) is statistically
signiﬁcant (and strong). We know that the sharp eﬀect of the Dini and Amato
pension reform is documented by Bottazzi et al. (2006), who estimate for instance
that, with a retirement age of 60, the replacement rate (the ratio between pension
income and work income before retirement) drops by 1 percent only for older private
employees who had more than 27 years of contribution, compared to a drop by 12.4%
for younger private employes. It is therefore not surprising that, if old-age security
motive for childbearing prevails, this shows up as the eﬀect of the pension reform.
From now onwards, our results refer to the second dataset, i.e., the one with
discrete-time data on persons years, and to estimates based on eq. 5.3. We specify a
model in which we estimate the joint eﬀect of the reforms, i.e., the post-1992 eﬀect.
Table 4 displays the results of a ﬁrst probit hazard model, in which age of the
husband and age of the wife (using ﬁxed-eﬀects) are time-varying covariates, and in
which we control for ﬁx e dp e r i o de ﬀects using dummy variables for each year. The
marginal eﬀect of the reform on the annual probability of having an additional birth
24is 0.67%. This eﬀect can be compared to the observed (average) annual probability,
which is above 5%. The reform is estimated to raise the annual probability of having
a(nother) child by 12.7% in relative terms. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. This analysis, which makes use of additional information contained in
the data and controls for time-varying eﬀects, thus conﬁrms the results obtained on
the ﬁrst dataset.
We now run two types of robustness checks for the reform eﬀect using the second
dataset. A ﬁrst robustness check regards the size of the time window around the
reform we use. Our standard models use a +/-7 year-wide window. The fact that
age (controlled via ﬁxed eﬀects) is not behind the estimated eﬀect is reassuring,
but we conduct a second robustness check by using shorter time windows around
the reform. Table 5 contains the output of such checks, compared to the reform
eﬀect displayed in Table 4. The eﬀect is stable with a +/- 3 year window. It is
much higher, still signiﬁcantly positive, but estimated with lower precision, as the
window becomes the smallest one (+/- 1 year). The stability of the estimates with
t h ev a r i a t i o no ft h et i m ew i n d o wi sas i g no fr o b u s t n e s so ft h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of the
reform on fertility.
A second robustness check of our identiﬁcation strategy is a placebo test, which
is often used in studies that exploit discontinuities, like ours. More speciﬁcally, we
estimate the eﬀect of two discontinuities that we expect not to matter, as they are
n o ti nf a c tr e l a t e dt ot h er e f o r m .Aﬁrst discontinuity (“Younger” placebo) is placed
around 10 years of contributions in 1992, with a window of +/- 1 years around the
discontinuity. A second discontinuity (“Older” placebo) is placed around 20 years of
contributions in 1992, with a window of +/- 1 years around the discontinuity. The
estimates of placebo eﬀects are compared with the estimates of the reform eﬀect
with a +/-1 years time window in Table 6. Indeed, placebo eﬀects are not statis-
tically signiﬁcant, which is what we expect if our identiﬁcation strategy through a
discontinuity in years of contributions picks the reform eﬀect: only the discontinuity
around the actual reform matters.
A ﬁnal piece of analysis concerns the diﬀerential eﬀect of the reform on various
categories of workers. As outlined in Section 3, the Amato and Dini reforms had a
25larger eﬀect on public-sector dependent workers, followed by private-sector depen-
dent workers and self-employed. We therefore develop a model in which the eﬀect
of the reform is interacted with the category of workers (unfortunately, this is only
available at the time of the survey). Results, reported in Table 7, are consistent
with the expectation (a larger eﬀect for public-sector workers and a smaller eﬀect
for self-employed), although they are never statistically signiﬁcant. This could point
out to the fact that the diﬀerentials in the eﬀect might simply be too small, or to
t h ef a c tt h a to u rm e a s u r e m e n to fw o r k e r ’ sc a t e g o r ya tt h et i m eo ft h es u r v e yd o e s
not precisely capture the actual category.
7. Discussion
Starting from the two main models of fertility decisions, we have designed a test of
the “old-age security” motive for childbearing versus the classical Becker and Barro
(1988) “kids as consumption good” motive in a contemporary low fertility society,
characterized by strong family ties — Italy. We have exploited the discontinuity
induced by two parallel pension reforms held in 1992 and 1995. Both reforms have
generated a natural experiment that has exogenously reduced the pension income
prospects of individuals with years of contribution below speciﬁc thresholds, while
leaving others unaﬀected. We have estimated the eﬀect of these changes on fertility.
Our results show that individuals who have lower pension income prospects,
because they are aﬀected by the reform, have signiﬁcantly higher fertility. The
relative increase of the realized fertility or of the probability of having a child is
above 10%. These ﬁndings are not in line with the “traditional” Becker and Barro
(1988) theory of fertility based on consumption motives. Perhaps surprisingly, given
the conventional wisdom for developed societies, they emphasize the relevance of
the old-age security motive for fertility. This result is however consistent with the
existence of strong family ties in the Italian, as well as in several other contemporary
developed societies (see for instance the ranking according to a measure of family
ties by Alesina and Giuliano, 2007). In these environments, parents may reasonably
expect their kids to give them old-age support, for instance as in-kind or monetary
transfers. Moreover, our ﬁndings are robust to diﬀerent robustness checks, including
26several placebo tests.
We believe that our results are of general relevance for the study of fertility
motives in developed societies, as they contribute to identify a clear negative impact
of pension policy on fertility decisions. This is of particular relevance to the study of
very-low and “lowest-low” fertility. If part of the fertility decline can be attributed
to the diﬀusion of pension systems, the introduction of pension reforms that decrease
the income prospects after retirement might contribute to a rise in fertility. Indeed,
fertility in Italy had its minimum in 1996 and since then it is slowly rising. Further
empirical evidence is needed on the contribution of the old-age security motive to
total fertility in contemporary societies. Our results suggest that more research
should be devoted to identify a more comprehensive model of fertility decisions
which combines some characteristics of the two traditional fertility models existing
in the literature with additional features that have recently gained importance in
developed societies, such as in-kind and time transfers or personalized old age care.
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32Appendix
Another Model of "Kid as Consumption Good"
A recent literature has used a reduced form version of the Becker-Barro model,
in which individuals cares about their youth and old age consumption, and about
the number of kids they have, according to the following utility function (see also
Galor and Weil, 2000, Galor and Moav, 2002, de la Croix and Doepke, 2003, and






where δ ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures the relative importance of the number
of children in the individual utility function. To simplify the analysis, we use a
logarithmic utility function, and assume that parents leave an exogenous bequest,
bt, to their children12.













where the left hand side represents the marginal utility from having an additional
child, and the right hand side the marginal disutility, in terms of consumption
forgone in youth, due to the cost of raising the kid and of providing her with a
bequest. Using this equation, the ﬁrst order condition for the saving decision and
the budget constraints at eq. 4.1 and 4.2 (with dt = dt+1 =0 ), we can obtain the












From this expression, it is easy to see that — for given levels of bequest (bt,b t+1)





t+1. This is entirely driven by the negative income eﬀect.
Individuals who are negatively aﬀected by the pension reforms face a lower life time
12In the model at section 4.1, the choice of the bequest is endogenous.
33income, and reduce their consumption of goods in youth and old age, as well as their
"consumption of kids", provided that kids are not an inferior good.
Yet, the level of bequest is likely to depend (positively) on the parents life time
income, since richer parents will leave more generous bequests to their children.
With the bequest at time t +1being a positive function of individuals’ life time
income, bt+1 = b(Yt) where Yt = yt + bt + Pt+1/Rt+1, the impact of the pension



















bt+1.T h u s , t h e a ﬀected group will have lower fertility than the
unaﬀected group, i.e., ∂ft/∂Pt+1 > 0,i fεb,Y < 1+
γRt+1
bt+1 ; in other words, if the
bequest to the children is not a superior good. Hence, if our empirical analysis were
to suggest a reduction in fertility of the individuals aﬀected by the Italian pension
reforms of the 90s, this result would be consistent with kids being considered a
consumption good.







Pension indexation  Cost of living plus real 
earnings growth 
Cost of living  Cost of living 
Pension to survivor  60% to spouse 
20% to each child 
40% to each child (if no 
spouse) 
Same Same 
Years of contributions 
for eligibility 
15 20  5 
Early retirement 
provision 
Any age if contributed to 
SS for 35 years or more, 
no actuarial adjustment 
Any age if contributed to 
SS for 35 years or more, 
no actuarial adjustment 
No early retirement 
provision 
Total Payroll tax  24.5% of gross earnings  27.17% of gross earnings 32.7% of gross earnings 
 
  Pre-1993 regime  1992 reform  1995 reform 




Any age after 56 (for both 
men and women) 
 
Transitional period    Until about 2032       Until about 2035 
Pensionable earnings  Average of last 5 years 
real earnings (converted 
to real values through 
price index) 
Career average earnings 
(converted to real values 
through price index + 
1%) 
Career contributions 
(capitalized  using a 5-
year moving average of 
GDP growth rate) 
Pension benefit  2%*(pensionable 
earnings)*(t), 
where t is years of tax 
payments (at most 40) 
2%*(pensionable 
earnings)*(t), 
where t is years of tax 
payments (at most 40) 
Proportional to 
capitalized value of 
career contributions, the 
proportionality factor 
increasing with age at 
retirement (from .04720 





















































Figure 4. Age distribution in 1993 for husbands unaffected and affected by the reforms. 
























Mean age in 1993 for N=201 unaffected=36.57 years, for N=198 affected=35.45 years. Difference 
significant at the 1% level (t-test). 
 
Figure 5. Age distribution in 1993 for wives unaffected and affected by the reforms. Window: 

























Mean age in 1993 for N=201 unaffected=32.88 years, for N=198 affected=31.67 years. Difference 
significant at the 1% level (t-test).  
 
 
Table 1. Differences between individuals who are affected and unaffected by the reforms. +/- 
1 year-window around the reforms’ thresholds. 
 
 Unaffected 
(up to - 1 year)
Affected 
(up to +1 year)
Number of children (up to 1993) 1.3831  1.3788 
  (0.0742) (0.0802) 
    
Number of children (after 1993)  0.3134 0.4899*** 
  (0.0421) (0.0468) 
    




    
Number of children (after 1996)  0.2338 0.3586** 
  (0.0360) (0.0410) 
    





    
    
N 201  198 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels on the 2-tail t-test on the hypothesis of difference between the affected and the unaffected: * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in subsequent analyses. Window: +/- 7 years 
of contributions around the reforms’ thresholds, women born 1955 or after. 
 
 Mean  s.d. 
Reform (dummy) 0.5965   
    
Number of children (up to 1993) 1.2522  1.0260 
    
Number of children (after 1993)  0.5089 0.7338 
    
Number of children (up to 1996) 1.3864  1.0213 
    
Number of children (after 1996)  0.3748 0.6382 
    
Education (husband, years)  10.4411 3.4473 
    
Education (wife, years)  10.6971 3.4377 
    
Age at interview (husband)  45.6997 5.4437 
    
Age at interview (wife)  41.6651 5.1768 
    
Center as area of birth (dummy)  .1803  
    
South as area of birth (dummy)  .3882  
    
Survey year 1998 (dummy)  .0384  
    
Survey year 2000 (dummy) .2086   
    
Survey year 2002 (dummy) .2198   
 






N 2684   
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2006).  
 
  
Table 3. Effect of pension reforms on post-reform fertility (total number of children or 
probability of having at least an additional child). Window: +/- 7 years of contributions 
around the reforms’ thresholds, women born 1955 or after. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 OLS  Amato+Dini 
Reform 








        
Reform 0.0529*  0.0329  0.0717***  0.0312 
 (0.0287)  (0.0253)  (0.0247)  (0.0227) 
Education 
(husband) 
0.00465 0.00392 0.00521  0.00365 
 (0.00437)  (0.00386)  (0.00391)  (0.00350) 
Education  
(wife) 
0.0166*** 0.0158*** 0.0159***  0.0173*** 
  (0.00428) (0.00377) (0.00377)  (0.00332) 
Center  -0.00184 0.00762  0.0318  0.0199 
 (0.0339)  (0.0299)  (0.0300)  (0.0267) 
South  0.108*** 0.0848*** 0.0865***  0.0736*** 
 (0.0286)  (0.0253)  (0.0253)  (0.0227) 
Year 1998  -0.728*** -0.652*** -0.340***  -0.254*** 
 (0.0726)  (0.0636)  (0.0174)  (0.0113) 
Year 2000  -0.457*** -0.451*** -0.291***  -0.269*** 
 (0.0412)  (0.0362)  (0.0251)  (0.0176) 
Year 2002  -0.320*** -0.295*** -0.215***  -0.202*** 
 (0.0369)  (0.0325)  (0.0259)  (0.0193) 
Year 2004  -0.149*** -0.115*** -0.103***  -0.0825*** 
 (0.0360)  (0.0317)  (0.0283)  (0.0233) 
Number of children 
(up to 1993) 
-0.175***  -0.132***   
 (0.0141)    (0.0126)   
Number of children 
(up to 1996) 
 -0.134***   -0.102*** 
   (0.0121)    (0.0109) 
Constant  -0.105 0.146     
  (0.678) (0.598)     
       
 























N  2684 2684 2661  2661 
R-squared  0.320 0.299  .  . 
       
Observed P     0.3856  0.2996 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 4. Marginal effect of pension reforms on the annual probability of having an 
additional child (discrete-time probit event-history model on persons-years). Window: +/- 7 
years of contributions around the reforms’ thresholds, women born 1955 or after. 
  





Education (husband)  0.000583 
 (0.000427) 
Education (wife)  0.00152*** 
 (0.000402) 
Center  0.0100*** 
 (0.00285) 
South  0.00291 
  (0.00328) 
Number of children (up to 1993)  -0.0145*** 
 (0.00147) 
















N (persons-years)  19760 
   
Observed P  0.0522 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 5. Marginal effect of pension reforms on the annual probability of having an 
additional child (discrete-time probit event-history model on persons-years) (varying 




+/- 7 years 
(2) 
window: 
+/- 3 years 
(3) 
window: 
+/- 1 year 
   
     
0.00664** 0.00662*  0.0169**  Reform 
(0.00286) (0.00341) (0.00727) 
     
     






     
Observed P  0.0522 0.0485 0.0535 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2006, persons-years reconstruction).  
Same control variables as for the models in Table 4. 
 
Table 6. Marginal effect of pension reforms on the annual probability of having an 
additional child (discrete-time probit event-history model on persons-years): placebo test 











+/- 1 year) 
(3) 
“Older” 
placebo   
(window: 
+/- 1 year) 
   
     
-0.00850 0.0169** 0.00426  Reform 
(0.0118) (0.00727)  (0.00482) 
     
      
N (persons-
years) 
2198 2450 1147 
     
Observed P  0.0996 0.0535 0.0235 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, persons-years reconstruction).  
Same control variables as for the models in Table 4. The “Younger” placebo model estimates the effect of a 
discontinuity around 10 years of contributions in 1992, with a window of +/- 1 year around the discontinuity. The 
“Older” placebo model estimates the effect of a discontinuity around 20 years of contributions in 1992, with a 
window of +/- 1 year around the discontinuity.  
Table 7. Marginal effect of pension reforms on the annual probability of having an 
additional child for various groups of workers (discrete-time probit event-history model on 













N (persons-years)  19760 
  
Observed P  0.0522 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, persons-years reconstruction).  
Same control variables as for the models in Table 4. 
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